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MEDICAID AND DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT: AN
ONGOING BATTLE BETWEEN EXPENSE
AND HEALTH
JENNIFER K. SQUILLARIO*
INTRODUCTION
In many states, to have an item of durable medical equipment
(DME) covered by a state's Medicaid program, the item must be listed
as a covered item in a state's preapproved list, and a Medicaid recipi-
ent's physician must certify that the item is medically necessary for the
health of the recipient. The lists are rarely updated. In a recent case
that ultimately went to the United States Supreme Court, one state's
use of a preapproved list and the methodology used to establish that
list was challenged. The case raises questions about how states estab-
lish lists of what kinds of DME should be covered and how benefi-
ciaries may challenge decisions that deny coverage because an item is
not on the list of covered DME, even though it meets a state's defini-
tion of DME.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
DeSario v. Thomas1 held that a state may use a predetermined list of
DME for subsequent coverage decisions, and the state does not have
to cover all "medically necessary" services as long as what the state
does cover is "adequate to meet the needs of the Medicaid population
of the state."2 The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
wrote a guidance letter in response to the Second Circuit's decision,
and the letter declares that a state may use a preapproved list of DME
for coverage determinations, but "[i]n evaluating a request for an
* B.A. 1997, Columbia University, Columbia College; J.D. 2000, University of Mary-
land School of Law.
1. 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 90-91. The Medicaid Act does not provide a definition for "medically neces-
sary." DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 132 (D. Conn. 1997). According to the district
court in DeSario, the Supreme Court provided a workable definition of medically necessary
in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) and in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) as a "profes-
sional judgment made by a physician considering the physical, emotional, psychological,
and familial factors relevant to the well-being of the patient." DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 132.
Medical necessity has, however, also been defined as "[h]ealth care provided to correct or
diminish the adverse effects of a mental condition or mental illness; to assist an individual
in attaining or maintaining an optimal level of health; to diagnose a condition; or prevent
a medical condition from occurring." Health Advocate No. 195.12. But see infra notes 138-
157 and accompanying text (describing the Medicaid population as a whole test and the
departure from traditional reliance on physician's decisions).
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item of [D]ME, a State may not use a 'Medicaid population as a
whole' test"' as the Court of Appeals had employed in DeSario.4 Grant-
ing certiorari, the Supreme Court in Slekis v. Thomas' vacated and re-
manded the case to the Court of Appeals "for further consideration in
light of the interpretative guidance issued by the Health Care Financ-
ing Administration on September 4, 1998. "6
According to HCFA, the Medicaid population as a whole test "re-
quires a beneficiary to demonstrate that, absent coverage of the item
requested, the needs of 'most' Medicaid recipients will not be met."7
HCFA's letter, however, does not explicitly provide a standard for eval-
uating DME requests when the equipment satisfies the definition of
DME but is not on the list of covered DME.8 The letter, however, does
declare that the criteria that a state uses should be "reasonable."9 This
Comment will survey cases that have dealt with the issue of coverage of
DME for the Medicaid population, describe the HCFA letter of gui-
dance and argue that eliminating the Medicaid population as a whole
test but not providing a clear test in its stead only slightly decreases a
state's discretion in evaluating requests for coverage' ° and leaves
Medicaid recipients who need DME but have been denied coverage at
a disadvantage.
Courts and states should place considerable weight, in the ab-
sence of clear criteria, on the medical necessity of a piece of DME for
a Medicaid recipient who has been denied coverage because the par-
ticular DME is not on a preapproved list but meets the definition of
DME. Medical necessity is given considerable weight when determin-
ing whether a piece of DME on a preapproved list should be covered
for a specific patient. Furthermore, the burden of proof should rest
on the state to prove that it is not medically necessary to cover the
3. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, Director of The Department of Health & Human
Services, Health Care Financing Administration, to State Medicaid Directors 1 (Sept. 4,
1998) (on file at <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/smd90498.htm>).
4. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 91.
5. 119 S. Ct. 864 (1999).
6. Id. Slekis was an intervening party in DeSario, and was the only remaining plaintiff
on appeal to the Supreme Court. Id.
7. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. States traditionally have had wide discretion in determining coverage. See DeSario,
139 F.3d at 92 (stating that "[t]itle XIX affords states great latitude in determining the
scope and extent of coverage of medical services" (citing Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 933
(2d Cir. 1975))).
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DME, and not on the Medicaid recipient or on his or her doctor. 1
Additionally, a showing of the percentage of Medicaid recipients us-
ing the DME should not be a requirement. This proposed shift in the
burden of proof away from the Medicaid recipient places the recipi-
ent in a better position in terms of having access to health care.
In compiling the preapproved list, a flexible standard, taking into
consideration various factors, should be used in addition to a panel of
experts that includes at least one doctor. The first and most impor-
tant factor that should be considered is the opinion of the Medicaid
recipient's treating physician. Other factors that should be consid-
ered are the benefit to the recipient, cost to the state, the existence of
alternative items that are as effective as the item in question, scientific
evidence such as randomized clinical trials, and the recommendation
of a panel of experts including, for example, physicians, nurses, phar-
macists, and physical therapists, who could properly decipher and an-
alyze the scientific evidence. It is, however, more likely that courts
and states will use a test just short of the Medicaid population as a
whole test because it is thought that relying upon a physician's deci-
sion leads to states having to provide all medically necessary services,
1 2
an increase in Medicaid spending, and physicians rather than states
determining what will be covered.' 3
The ultimate purpose of this Comment is to denounce the Medi-
caid population as a whole test or any variant thereof while advocating
an increased reliance on a physician's expertise in determining cover-
age at all levels. Part I will describe generally the Medicaid statute and
the limited standards it supplies for defining medical necessity, cover-
age, and DME. Additionally, Part I will account the facts and reason-
ing of DeSario at both the district court and appellate court levels. Part
II sets out the Supreme Court's decision in DeSario and describes
HCFA's guidance letter. Part III explains the Medicaid population as
a whole test, and Part IV does the same for the physician's discretion
test. Part V illustrates the many deficiencies of the Medicaid popula-
tion as a whole test as evidenced in case law and by the medical profes-
11. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medically Neces-
sary?, 340 NEW ENG.J. MED. 229, 229 (1999) ("In our view, an insurer should be able to set
aside the recommendations of a treating physician only in restricted circumstances.").
12. Courts have supported the proposition that states do not have to provide all medi-
cally necessary treatments, and thus, states have broad discretion in determining coverage.
See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (finding that the Medicaid statute does not
require that a state fund "every medical procedure that falls within the delineated catego-
nies of medical care"); DeSario, 139 F.3d at 92 (maintaining that states do not have to "fund
every medically necessary procedure or item").
13. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 95-96.
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sion. Part V also argues that the Medicaid population as a whole test
results in an extreme form of rationing and that the physician's discre-
tion test should be implemented instead. In addition, the section de-
scribes generally Medicare's system of coverage and how Medicaid
should adopt Medicare's use of a hierarchy of evidence for determin-
ing coverage at the national level. Lastly, this paper advocates for the
use of a flexible standard for determining which pieces of DME will be
covered and takes into consideration various factors such as the physi-
cian's discretion, which would weigh heavier than cost concerns.
I. DESARIO v. THOMAS
A. The Applicable Federal Medicaid Regulations and Statutes
The Medicaid program is a joint federal and state "medical assis-
tance program that provides health care to specified categories of in-
dividuals and families who are financially and categorically eligible for
these services. '"" The State of Connecticut participates in the pro-
gram, 5 and therefore, must guarantee that the state plan complies
with the federal Medicaid statute.1 6 According to the Medicaid stat-
ute, Connecticut must provide services to adults with severe disabili-
ties who are unable to work due to a medical condition.' 7
Additionally, the statute mandates that states that participate in Medi-
caid must provide certain services such as home health services. t8
Home health services include "[m]edical supplies, equipment, and
appliances suitable for use in the home."19 The statute also states that
optional services exist that Connecticut may include in its medical as-
sistance plan.2" Home health services, for example, are mandatory for
14. DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Conn. 1997). The program was
enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396,
1396(10) (c) (1970 ed., Supp. V) (stating that its purpose is for "enabling each State, as far
as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish . . . medical assistance on
behalf of families with dependant children and aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.).
15. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-604.
16. See DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 124 (citing Wilder v. VA Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 501
(1990); Bethpage Lutheran Serv., Inc. v. Weicker, 965 F.2d 1239, 1240 (2d Cir. 1992);
Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 1980)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a).
18. Id. § 1396a(a)(13)(B)-(C).
19. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b) (3). Home health services also provide for nursing services
and a home health aide. Id. § 440.70(b) (1)-(2).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)-(17).
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some groups and optional for others.21 Connecticut, however, pro-
vides home health services to all Medicaid recipients. 22
Furthermore, the federal Medicaid statute mandates that in de-
termining the extent of coverage, a state's plan must include "reasona-
ble standards ... [to] the extent of medical assistance" in accordance
with the purpose of the Medicaid statute,23 and that the state must
furnish "safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility and
services under the plan be determined... in a manner.., consistent
with the best interests of the recipients. ' 24 Mandating "reasonable
standards" entrusts broad discretion to determine the extent of medi-
cal assistance. 25 Additionally, the federal Medicaid program has the
broad primary objective "to enable each [s] tate, as far as practicable,
to furnish medical assistance to individuals whose income and re-
sources are insufficient to meet the costs of medically necessary
services. ,26
It follows that Connecticut "may place appropriate limits on a
[covered] service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on
utilization control procedures."27 When and if Connecticut places
such limits, they must still ensure that the service provided is "suffi-
cient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its pur-
pose. '28  Additionally, Connecticut "may not arbitrarily deny or
reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service . . .
[based on] diagnosis, type of illness, or condition."29 These statutes
are relevant for determining coverage of home health services includ-
ing DME. From these statutes, the Court of Appeals in DeSario con-
cluded that the Medicaid population as a whole test is sufficient to
determine whether coverage is adequate when a Medicaid beneficiary
is appealing a denial of DME that is not on a state's preapproved
plan.3 °
21. See DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that those ser-
vices are "mandatory for certain groups of eligible individuals and optional for others").
22. Id. (citing State of Connecticut, Department of Income Maintenance, Connecticut
Medical Assistance Provider Manual for Medical Equipment, Devices and Supplies § 189.D
(MAP Manual)).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17).
24. Id. § 1396a(a) (19).
25. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (explaining that the statutory language
"confers broad discretion").
26. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(10)(C) (1970 ed., Supp.
V)).
27. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d).
28. Id. § 440.230(b).
29. Id. § 440.230(c).
30. See DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 92, 96-98 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the objec-
tive of the Medicaid statute and its employment in deciding coverage and the use of the
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
B. The Facts
DeSario's focus is on Connecticut's coverage of DME in the state's
Medicaid program.3 Connecticut broadly defines DME as follows:
"DME" means equipment which meets all of the following
requirements:
a. Can withstand repeated use
b. Is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical
purpose
c. Generally is not useful to a person in the absence of
an illness or injury
d. Excludes items that are disposable.3 2
Additionally, Connecticut has a list of over 100 DMEs that are cov-
ered, and coverage is limited to the list.3 3 Connecticut also has a list
of DME excluded from coverage such as roomsize humidifiers, purifi-
ers (including electronic air filters), dehumidifiers, air conditioners,
and stair glides.3 4 To obtain a reimbursement for any DME, a Medi-
caid recipient is required to obtain prior authorization "for all DME
rentals, replacement DME, and all DME costing over $100.'"
Medicaid population as a whole test); Letter from Sally K Richardson, supra note 3, at 1
(stating that coverage determinations must be reasonable and consistent with the objective
of the Medicaid Act and that states should not use the Medicaid population as a whole test
in assessing claims for coverage of DME not on a state's preapproved list).
31. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83. According to the Code of Federal Regulations for the Medi-
care Act, DME
means equipment, furnished by a supplier or a home health agency that-
(1) Can withstand repeated use;
(2) Is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose;
(3) Generally is not useful to an individual in the absence of an illness or
injury; and
(4) Is appropriate for use in the home.
42 C.F.R. § 414.202. This is the only definition of DME available at the federal level be-
cause DME is not defined in the Medicaid Act. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 88-89. The Court of
Appeals in DeSario used the Medicare definition as a reference point and to compare Con-
necticut's definition of DME in its Medicaid plan. Id.
32. Id. at 83 (citing MAP Manual § 189.B). The MAP Manual is the Connecticut Medi-
cal Assistance Provider Manual for Medical Equipment, Devices and Supplies and "explains
Connecticut's coverage of the items listed in its title." Id. Connecticut's definition does
not say that the piece of DME must be for use in the home, but does exclude disposable
items unlike the definition in the Medicare Act. See supra note 31 (discussing Medicare's
definition of DME). Connecticut's state agency regulations explain "disposable" as includ-
ing such items as plastic bed pans, and also, excludes from the definition of DME items,
which are customized or personalized such as braces and prosthetics. CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 17-2-80B.
33. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83 (citing MAP Manual § 189.E.II.a).
34. Id. (citing MAP Manual § 189.E.III.a).
35. Id. (citing MAP Manual § 189.F.II.a).
[VOL. 59:669
DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
The plaintiffs, "as representatives of similarly situated Medicaid
recipients" sued the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of
Social Services (DSS), Joyce A. Thomas, because of DSS's denial of the
plaintiffs "prior authorization requests seeking Medicaid reimburse-
ment for certain items to which they claim[ed] entitlement as
DME. ' 36 The district court then certified two subclasses of plaintiffs. v
The first class is the "DeSario" subclass and included all of Connecti-
cut's Medicaid recipients "who have been, or who in the future, will be
denied Medicaid coverage" for equipment that the recipients claim to
be DME, on the basis that the DME is not included on DSS's list for
such equipment. 38 The representative of the class was Concetta
DeSario, a quadriplegic, who requested payment for an environmen-
tal control unit that controls appliances and costs about $7000 to
$8000.39 Without the unit, she was unable to reposition her bed and
relieve any respiratory distress.4 ° Additionally, the unit allowed
DeSario to stay in her home rather than having to go to a long-term
care facility. 4 '
The second class, the "Emerson" subclass, consisted of all of Con-
necticut's Medicaid recipients "who have been, or who in the future
will be, denied Medicaid coverage" for equipment that the recipients
claim to be DME, on the basis that DME is not included on DSS's list
and has been "specifically excluded from coverage."42 The represent-
atives for this class were Elizabeth Emerson, who had requested prior
authorization for an air conditioner and an air purifier, and Caroline
Stevenson who had requested prior authorization for an air purifier
and a room size humidifier.43 Both Emerson and Stevenson suffered
from a chemical sensitivity condition.44 Emerson, due to her condi-
tion, was highly susceptible "to severe reactions to air-borne environ-
36. Id. The plaintiffs based their claim on MAP Manual §§ 189.E.II.a, 189.E.III.a. Id.;
see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
37. DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 141 (D. Conn. 1992) (ruling on pending
motions).
38. Id. In other words, this class consists of those who were or will be denied coverage
based upon MAP Manual § 189.E.II.a. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83.
39. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83. An environmental control unit could help DeSario to "re-
position her bed, make and receive telephone calls, turn lights on and off, open her apart-
ment door, control her heat and air conditioning, [and] control her television." DeSario,
963 F. Supp. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Notice of Decision Re:
Concetta DeSario, March 28, 1996).
40. DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 129.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 141 (ruling on pending motions). The "Emerson" subclass was denied cover-
age on the basis of MAP Manual § 189.E.III.a. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83.
43. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83.
44. See id.
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mental toxins" that can only be prevented by an air conditioner and
an air purifier that eliminate these toxins.45 Without these DME, her
condition would only worsen and may ultimately result in "respiratory
distress."46 Stevenson, due to her condition, suffered "respiratory,
neurological, and allergy-like symptoms, muscle and joint pains, fa-
tigue, weakness, digestive and absorption difficulties, and periodic de-
pression."47 Without the prescribed DME, Stevenson would have
increased symptoms due to her inability to control such things as air-
borne molds, pollutants, and scented products.48
Additionally, Thomas Slekis intervened in the action, 49 and the
district court analyzed his case separately from the two subclasses due
to the "unique circumstances" of his case.5° Slekis was a paraplegic
and receives about $600 per month in disability benefits in addition to
Medicaid benefits. 51 Due to his confinement to beds and to wheel-
chairs, he suffered from decubiti that often require surgery and hospi-
talization.52 Since 1985, Slekis has had fifteen to twenty flap surgeries
to help his problem with decubiti.53 According to his physician's testi-
mony, however, the procedure may only be able to be completed one
or two more times in the region of his buttocks before exhausting the
remedy.54 After exhaustion of this procedure, the only remaining op-
tions would be more serious surgeries.55 If the decubiti is not treated,
it "presents a significant risk of infection, which may lead to perma-
nent impairment or death."56
In October 1996, Slekis had a flap procedure and an amputation
of his lower left leg "to address a sore on [his] left foot that.., showed
signs of dangerous deterioration."5'' While the sore on his foot
originated from a burn that would not heal properly, the ongoing
45. DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 129-30.
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83.
50. DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 135.
51. See id.
52. See id. In particular, Slekis has recurrent bedsores or decubiti in his hips, buttocks,
and feet. See id. The surgery requires "cleaning out the sore, shifting nearby tissue into the
resulting hole, and closing the skin on top." Id. The surgery may also require up to two
weeks of hospitalization. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. Because a patient only has a limited amount of tissue surrounding a
decubitus, the flap surgery cannot be conducted indefinitely. See id.
55. See id. at 135-36. One such surgery is the "grisly 'fillet' procedure" which requires
the sacrificing of a leg in order to obtain enough tissue to fill the wound. Id. at 136.
56. Id. at 136.
57. Id.
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problems he experienced were likely related to the repeated trauma
that occurred as a result of transporting himself back and forth be-
tween the wheelchair and the bed.58 To prevent future hospitaliza-
tions, Slekis's physician prescribed a RIK mattress.5" Slekis's physician
testified that this mattress would help reduce Slekis's skin problems
and would prevent the need for future hospital admissions.6"
On October 31, 1996, Connecticut Rehab and Medical Products,
Inc. (Connecticut Rehab) requested prior authorization from DDS for
Slekis's mattress under the Medicaid program, but, in so doing, used
the appropriate Medicare code for an RIK mattress.61 On the same
day, the mattress was delivered to Slekis.62 His physician testified that
since Slekis had received the special bed, his "skin was in better shape
than it had been for years."63 DSS, however, in response to Connecti-
cut Rehab's request, sent Connecticut Rehab "a Request for Informa-
tion," which stated that the code used was not valid for Medicaid
recipients and that there were less expensive codes for DME that
would have also met Slekis's needs.64 The district court stated that
Slekis demonstrated that no other Medicaid codes existed for the RIK
mattress or a similar DME, and concluded that the DSS response con-
stituted a denial of prior authorization.6
C. The Court's Reasoning
1. The District Court's Analysis.-
a. The Use of a DME Fee Schedule to Determine Coverage. -The
district court found that the use of a preapproved DME list is not per
se unlawful,66 but that Connecticut's list in its "present form" as an
exclusive list "violates federal Medicaid law because it improperly limits
the amount, duration, and scope of medically necessary durable medical
58. See id. Such trauma can be caused by banging parts of his body against the hard
surfaces of a wheelchair and by "dragging his body across the surface of his bed." Id.
59. See id. The RIK mattress is "filled with an oil-based liquid and covered with excep-
tionally loose-fitting sheets." Id. The mattress costs $840 a month to rent. See DeSario v.
Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1998).
60. See DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 136.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Pl.'s Ex. 1).
65. See id. ("Accordingly, the Court concluded that, though denominated a 'request for
information,' the defendant's response was effectively a denial of prior authorization for
the RIK mattress.").
66. Id. at 131.
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equipment."67 This decision was based on the facts that the defen-
dant did "not have any procedure for systematically, timely, or effec-
tively updating this dispositive list as new equipment comes on the
market even if the new items meet the defendant's general definition
of 'durable medical equipment,"' and that the defendant's "policies
and operation of the prior approval system lack any mechanism by
which a recipient can demonstrate that an item of unlisted but medi-
cally necessary equipment otherwise meets the definition of DME,
such that it can be added to the list or otherwise be considered for
prior approval. 68
It is important to note that the district court did not find that the
use of a list is unlawful per se. 69 The court asserted that the Medicaid
Act has been construed to give broad discretion to states to adopt stan-
dards for the determination of the scope of medical assistance.7 0 Ad-
ditionally, the court stated that HCFA has given states the authority to
put "a money ceiling upon medical supplies and equipment based on
a reasonable, fixed dollar amount per month or per year," and has
also allowed states to require prior authorization for DME which costs
a certain amount.7 " Therefore, the court found that a list is permitted
as long as there is a method for seeking modifications or alterations of
the list. 7 2
b. The Categorical Exclusion of Pieces of DME.-The district
court also held, however, that DSS's categorical exclusion of certain
pieces of DME, in particular air conditioners, air purifiers, and room
humidifiers,7" without considering medical necessity, violates federal
Medicaid law.7" The district court found that DSS "may not categori-
cally exclude a piece of DME without considering the medical neces-
67. Id. at 130 (emphasis added); see supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the federal Medicaid program).
68. DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 130 (citing Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga.
1977)). The district court noted that the defendant's witness, Ms. Geary, testified that
DSS's policies did not provide exceptions for noncovered DME, even if the noncovered
DME was the only medical service available for treating a particular condition. Id. Ms.
Geary also stated that even though DSS is authorized to waive application of its regulations,
they have never done so "to provide Medicaid coverage for durable medical equipment not
on the MEDS fee schedule." Id (citing May 20 Hearing, Trans. at 123).
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977)); see supra note 10 (discussing this
broad discretion).
71. DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 131 (quoting MSA Medical Assistance Manual, § 5-50.1-00
(distributed as SRS Action Transmittal SRS-AT-77-26 (Feb. 16, 1977)).
72. Id. at 132.
73. These pieces of DME were excluded under Conn. MAP Manual § 189.III.E.a. Id.
74. Id. at 132-33.
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sity of an item either on a 'macro' or 'micro' level."75 The macro level
refers to a legislative determination of what is medically necessary, and
the micro level refers to a physician's decision "that the condition of
his patient warrants the administering of a type of medical assistance
which the plan makes available."76 Here, Connecticut made neither
type of decision.77 The district court, therefore, appears to advocate
determining coverage of medically necessary DME through the legis-
lature or through the physician of the Medicaid recipient. Nowhere
does the court refer to the number of Medicaid recipients who may
require the use of the specified DME for it to be covered by a state
Medicaid plan.7" In the end, the court enjoined DSS from using
Conn. MAP Manual § 189.E.II.a, which permits DSS to deny coverage
to Medicaid recipients for any DME not listed on the state's DME fee
schedule, and § 189.E.III.a which excludes specific DME from cover-
age "as the exclusive determinant of plaintiffs' pre-authorization re-
quests for" DME and granted an injunction to all of the plaintiffs.7 9
DSS appealed on the "claims that the district court erred in find-
ing that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving DSS's regulations
violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act and its regulations."80
The Court of Appeals held that the district court incorrectly con-
strued the Medicaid Act and "miscalculated the likelihood of plain-
tiffs' success on the merits."8" The Court of Appeals, therefore,
vacated the injunction and remanded the case. 82
2. The Court of Appeals Analysis.-
a. The Need to Consider Medical Necessity before Categorical Exclu-
sion.-The Court of Appeals first addressed the claims of the Emerson
subclass whose coverage of DME was denied because the DME was
specifically excluded from coverage by Connecticut's plan.8 3 Accord-
75. Id. at 133 (citing Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1979)).
76. Id. (quoting Preterm, 591 F.2d at 125).
77. See id at 133-34.
78. The court did state that DSS has ignored the fact that certain DME may be medi-
cally necessary for some Medicaid recipients even though they may be only "palliative for
others." Id. at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jeneski v. Myers, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 178 (1984)). The court, however, does not explain or define its use of the word
"palliative." The court, referring to the need of "some medical recipients," implies that
there would not have to be a large part of the Medicaid population that required the DME
for it to be covered.
79. Id. at 120, 140, 142-43.
80. DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
81. Id
82. Id.
83. Id. at 88; see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (describing the Emerson
subclass's claim).
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing to the court, the air conditioners, room size humidifiers, and air
purifiers all fall outside of Connecticut's definition of DME. s4 Addi-
tionally, the court stated that the district court was incorrect in assert-
ing that DSS can not exclude DME without first considering their
medical necessity. s5 Rather, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it did
not matter how medically necessary something may be to an individ-
ual, noting that although "gloves are medically necessary to persons
exposed to frost ... or even to the population as a whole, the state
need not (and in fact cannot) provide it unless it falls within a covered
medical service. '"86
The Court of Appeals then stated that Connecticut had adopted
"reasonable standards" as mandated by the Medicaid Act 7 for the de-
termination of which equipment are DME and if the DME would be
covered. 8 The Court of Appeals found that Connecticut's definition
of DME was "almost identical" to the wording of the federal regula-
tion that defines DME for the Medicare Act as laid out in 42 C.F.R.
§ 414.202 (1996).89 The court also found that "the use of identical
definitions by Connecticut and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) subverts the allegation that Connecticut's definition is
unreasonable."" ° Additionally, HHS endorsed Connecticut's defini-
tion of DME as reasonable, which is evidenced by the Secretary of
HHS's statement to the court that Connecticut has "apparently
adopted a reasonable definition of medical equipment which is based
in part on the definition used by the Secretary under the Medicare
program. '"91
The court gave significant deference to the Secretary's assess-
ments of Connecticut's definition and stated that "an agency's inter-
pretation of the statute covering a program it administers should
receive substantial deference."92 The court also gave deference to
84. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 88.
85. Id. at 88-90.
86. Id. at 88.
87. Id. at 88-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)17 (1994)); see supra note 23 and accompa-
nying text (providing relevant text).
88. DeSario, 139 F. Supp. at 37-38, 40.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 89; see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (providing the text of the
definition of DME by both Connecticut and the Medicare Act).
91. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 89 (quoting Brief of Third-Party Defendant Donna Shalala,
Secretary of HHS, at 10). Additionally, the Secretary's brief noted that it was appropriate
to compare the Medicare definition to Connecticut's because "with respect to medical
equipment, the Secretary has not required that States adopt the Medicare definitions, but
has permitted States to do so in whole or in part." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Brief of Third-Party Defendant Donna Shalala at 11).
92. Id. (citing Conn. Hosp. Ass'n v. Weiker, 46 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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Connecticut's distinction between equipment that is "primarily medi-
cal in nature" and equipment that is usually used for nonmedical pur-
poses but incidentally helps someone with a medical condition.93 The
court maintained that a state can reasonably refuse to cover such non-
medical equipment even if the physician who prescribed its use can
show a medical need for it.9 4 Furthermore, the court felt that if states
were required to cover whatever a physician prescribed and could
show was medically necessary, the states would have to cover such
equipment as heaters, vacuum cleaners, dishes, food, and bedding. 95
Therefore, the court held that Connecticut's definition of DME was
reasonable according to the Medicaid Act, and that the Act does not
require Connecticut to cover any DME outside of that definition; air
conditioners, air purifiers, and humidifiers all fell outside of the DME
definition under the Act, and that DSS properly denied Emerson's
and Stevenson's request for coverage of DME.16
b. The Individual Medicaid Recipient.-As for the DeSario sub-
class and for Slekis, the two types of DME that they requested were
covered by Connecticut's DME definition but coverage was denied be-
cause the DME were not included on the DSS fee schedule. 7 The
Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in finding "that
every medically necessary item of equipment satisfying the state's defi-
nition of DME must be provided," and reasoned instead that for the
state's coverage to be adequate, it only has to "meet the needs of the
Medicaid population of the state."9"
The Court of Appeals first agreed with the district court that Con-
necticut could use a list of covered equipment.99 The court then ex-
plained that a physician's belief that a piece of DME is medically
necessary does not mean that if the state does not provide coverage,
such coverage is insufficient.1 00 The court held that "a state need not
93. Id. (referencing Hosking v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 499 N.W.2d 436, 438
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993)).
94. Id. at 90 (citing Dougherty v. Department of Human Servs., 449 A.2d 1235, 1238
(NJ. 1982)).
95. Id. The court stated that the plaintiffs' definition of DME "would cover all the
necessaries of life, and some of its amenities." Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.; supra notes 38-41, 49-56 and accompanying text (discussing the DeSario
subclass and Slekis).
98. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 90-91; see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text
(describing the district court's reasoning).
99. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 91. The court noted that a 1977 Medical Assistance Manual
issued to state agencies administering HCFA medical assistance programs declares that
states may limit DME. Id. (quoting MSA Medical Assistance Manual, §§ 5-50.1-00).
100. Id.
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fund every medically necessary item of DME that falls within the
state's definition of DME."'O' Rather, coverage and medical necessity
are two "distinct concepts. "102 According to the court, the Medicaid
statute does not require "comprehensive coverage of all medically
necessary services, even all of those services provided by the state.' ' 0 3
Rather, the states have significant latitude to determine the scope of
their coverage."0 4 The court noted that this discretion is only slightly
limited by the Medicaid Act that requires the state to have reasonable
standards for determining coverage and must be "sufficient in
amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose."'0 5
The court further averred that if states were required to provide
all medically necessary services, it would constrict their ability to place
limitations on coverage.10 6 The only option would be to rely on the
decisions of physicians to decide what is medically necessary, which
the court believed would result in unlimited coverage because Medi-
caid recipients' physicians would be creating coverage and "budgeting
would be by a blank check."107 Therefore, the court rejected the view
that states must cover all medically necessary services because the sys-
tem would be "unworkable."' 0' 8 Rather, the objective of the state is to
101. Id. at 92.
102. Id
103. Id. at 93. The court, in support, referred to the Medicaid Act's requirement of
reasonable standards and the objectives of the Act. Id; see supra notes 12-28 and accompa-
nying text (providing the requirements of the Medicaid Act). The court also noted that
the Secretary of HHS, in her brief, noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (19) states that services
be furnished "in the best interests of recipients," but this statute does not mean that states
cannot place "amount, duration, and scope limitations which may affect some individuals
more than others." DeSario, 139 F.3d at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Brief of Third-Party Defendant Donna Shalala); see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303
(1985) (stating that the Medicaid Act gave "the States substantial discretion to choose the
proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage, as long as care and
services are provided in 'the best interests of the recipients'" (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) (19))); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (noting that the Medicaid statute
does not mandate that states fund all medical procedures which "fall[ ] within the deline-
ated categories of medical care").
104. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 92 (citing Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1975)).
105. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17))
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1996) (noting further that the plaintiffs erroneously in-
terpret the Medicaid Act as allowing states to limit coverage based only on certain identi-
fied criteria)).
106. Id. at 95 (stating a concern that such a requirement could even implicate limita-
tions based on a "lack of medical necessity"). Id.
107. Id. at 95-96 (citing Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989); Pinneke v.
Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 555 (8th Cir. 1980)). The court also explained that such a situation
would discourage states from adopting optional services listed in Title XIX for fear that for
each such service, the state would vastly enlarge the amount of "medically necessary care"
that physicians could require it to provide. Id. at 96.
108. Id. at 96.
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use reasonable standards to "meet the needs of the Medicaid popula-
tion of the state."' '° This objective may result in "an individual with a
rare condition or unusual needs, who must have a costly item of DME
that Connecticut has not chosen to cover and that is needed by a
handful of the Medicaid population .... hav[ing] to look for other
sources of assistance."110
c. The Medicaid Population as a Wole.-The court then dis-
cussed the Medicaid population as a whole standard. 1 ' First, plain-
tiffs have the burden of proving that Connecticut's coverage of DME
does not comply with federal law."1 2 The court stated that the "nor-
mal assumption [is] that an applicant is not entitled to benefits unless
and until he proves his eligibility."" 3 The court then applied this as-
sumption to a Medicaid recipient's "attack [of] a plan that has been
reviewed by a federal agency."'' 14
The plaintiffs argued that "Medicaid recipients should only have
the burden of proof as to information that is within their knowledge"
and that the "Medicaid statistics needed to evaluate the adequacy of
DME coverage for the Medicaid population as a whole" were not
within their knowledge. 1 5 The court essentially ignored this argu-
ment and pointed out that the plaintiffs could obtain this information
through discovery and administrative hearings "and therefore [bore]
no greater burden than in any other lawsuit. "116
Due to the burden of proof required by the Medicaid population
as a whole standard, the Court of Appeals found that the district court
was wrong in concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in
demonstrating that the fee schedule was inadequate "with respect to
the needs of the Medicaid population as whole.""' 7 The district court
came to this conclusion because there is no procedure for updating
the fee schedule and for Medicaid recipients to show that an item of
109. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985)).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id.; see infta notes 138-157 and accompanying text (defining the Medicaid popula-
tion as whole standard).
112. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 96.
113. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584
(1976)).
114. Id. (citing Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991)).
The court felt that the application of the assumption was particularly valid because Medi-
caid is a joint federal-state program that requires the approval of HHS. Id. (citing Perry v.
Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1996)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1316; 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.12-430.15.
115. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 97.
116. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-177b, 4-177c).
117. Id.
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DME falls within the definition of DME, and "the fee schedule was
developed and maintained with limited input from physicians having
the appropriate specializations.""'  The Court of Appeals felt, how-
ever, that new DME is always entering the market with little scientific
study so that frequent updates of the fee schedule would be unneces-
sary and difficult, and physicians are not needed to make the schedule
because the committee already includes a nurse and a physical thera-
pist who are medical professionals." 9 Furthermore, the court stated
that Medicaid recipients do have a method of appealing any denial at
a fair hearing where the recipient could show "that the absence of a
particular item of DME from the fee schedule renders the schedule
unreasonable and inadequate with respect to the needs of the Medi-
caid population of the state."' 2 ° The court thus concluded that using
a fee schedule to deny coverage does not violate the Medicaid Act,
and that the district court was wrong in enjoining DSS from using the
fee schedule.' 2 '
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND HCFA's LETTER
OF RECOMMENDATION
The Supreme Court in Slekis v. Thomas' 22 granted certiorari, va-
cated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit "for further consideration in light of the inter-
pretive guidance issued by the Health Care Financing Administration
on September 4, 1998. '112' HCFA'S "interpretive guidance" came in
118. Id. (citing DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 142).
119. Id.
120. Id. The court noted that the reasonableness and adequacy of the fee schedule to
the Medicaid population of the state is usually expressed in percentage terms. Id. (citing
Charleston Mem'l Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 1982); Curtis v. Taylor, 625
F.2d 645, 653 (5th Cir. 1980)).
121. Id. at 98.
122. 119 S. Ct. 864 (1999).
123. Id. at 864. It is interesting to note that DeSario died of pneumonia in February
1998. SeeJohnny Mason, Jr., Policies on Medicaid Spark Capitol Protest, THE HARTFORD COU-
RANT, Sept. 11, 1998. As a result of her death and the court of appeals decision, however,
over 100 people protested at Connecticut's state capitol asking for "legislative support in
asking the U.S. Supreme Court to send ... [the] appellate court decision back to the 2nd
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals for reconsideration." Id. Those protesting stated that they
wanted their legislature to be aware "that many people with disabilities were unable to get
the medical equipment they needed to survive." Id. Additionally, they pointed out that
only one item had been added to the list in the last five years and no methods existed "for
people with disabilities to add to the list-even when the equipment is potentially life-
saving." Id.
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the form of a letter to state Medicaid directors and in response to the
Court of Appeals decision in DeSario v. Thomas.'24
HCFA wrote a letter in response to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in DeSario, but the guidance it provides is "applicable
only to [D]ME coverage policy."'1 25 According to HCFA, a state may
use a preapproved list of DME for "administrative convenience be-
cause such a list eliminates the need to administer an extensive appli-
cation process for each [D]ME request submitted."' 26 Additionally,
HCFA states that a DME policy must provide a "reasonable and mean-
ingful procedure for requesting" DME that are not on the preap-
proved list. 1 27 By "reasonable and meaningful procedure," HCFA
appears to mean a "fair hearing" as the Court of Appeals mandated, 128
rather than the more personal system that the district court advo-
cated. 129 Additionally, the letter states that Medicaid recipients are to
be informed of their right to a fair hearing.' 3 Therefore, the letter is
rather vague as to what a "reasonable and meaningful procedure" is.
The letter also maintains that states can not use the "Medicaid
population as a whole" standard,' as advocated by the Court of Ap-
peals in DeSario.'32 HCFA described this test as requiring "a benefici-
ary to demonstrate that, absent coverage of the item requested, the
needs of 'most' Medicaid recipients will not be met.' 33 According to
HCFA, this test is inappropriate because it "establishes a standard that
virtually no individual item of [D]ME can meet," and thus mandating
that a Medicaid recipient meet such a standard does not provide
"meaningful opportunity for seeking modifications or exceptions to a
State's pre-approved list."'1 34 Therefore, the standard used by the
Court of Appeals was incorrect, but HCFA does not state what test
should be used instead, or if the district court's standard should be
employed.
HCFA, then, provided three conditions a state must meet "with
respect to an individual applicant's request for an item of [D]ME," to
124. See Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1-2 (providing guidance on the
use of exclusive lists with regards to DME).
125. Id. at 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 97 (2d Cir. 1998).
129. DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 130 (1998).
130. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 2.
131. Id. at 1.
132. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 96-98; see supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
133. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1.
134. Id.
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be in compliance with the federal Medicaid Act."3 5 First, the process
of gaining coverage must be "timely" and must use "reasonable and
specific criteria" for deciding whether DME will be covered.' 36 Ac-
cording to HCFA, the criteria for determining whether DME will be
covered "must be sufficiently specific to permit a determination of
whether an item of [D]ME that does not appear on a State's pre-
approved list has been arbitrarily excluded from coverage based solely
on a diagnosis, type of illness, or condition." '37 Additionally, the
state's preapproved list, criteria, and process must be available to the
public and to Medicaid recipients.13 Third, Medicaid beneficiaries
must be informed of their right to a fair hearing. 139
Lastly, HCFA provides a warning to the states "to be cognizant of
the approval decisions you make regarding items of [D]ME that do
not appear on a preapproved list, to ensure that the item of [D]ME is
covered for all beneficiaries who are similarly situated.""14 Also, states
should update their list of preapproved DME to "reflect available tech-
nology."14 ' It appears that HCFA is simply ensuring that all Medicaid
beneficiaries with the same conditions receive the DME that they need
and that states have a method of updating the list. Overall, the letter
does not provide much guidance. It still leaves much discretion to the
states, and it does not say which standard should be employed instead
of the Medicaid population as a whole standard.
A. The Medicaid Population as a Whole Test
According to HCFA, the Medicaid population as a whole test "re-
quires a beneficiary to demonstrate that, absent coverage of the item
requested, the needs of 'most' Medicaid recipients will not be met."' 4 2
HCFA, though, does not define what "most" is. Is it 50%, 70%, or
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id.; see 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (stating that a "Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily
deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service ... to an otherwise
eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition").
138. See Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 2.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 130 (finding that Connecticut did not have, but
should have had, a system for updating their preapproved list). But see DeSario, 139 F.3d at
97 (stating that updating the preapproved list is difficult because new DME are constantly
being produced with little scientific study).
142. Letter from Sally K Richardson, supra note 3, at 1. The Medicaid population as a
whole standard is also referred to as the "generalized evidence of medical necessity" test.
Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 230. This test is described as "link[ing] medical necessity to
broad standards based on evidence involving large groups of patients rather than to clini-
cally derived professional standards applied to particular patients." Id.
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90% of the population? The Court of Appeals in DeSario v. Thomas1 43
described the test as the state's coverage being able to provide DME
"adequate to meet the needs of the Medicaid population of the
state." 144 The test does not require that the state cover all medically
necessary services, and, therefore, DME that a Medicaid beneficiary's
physician has determined to be medically necessary, does not have to
be covered by the state plan and Medicaid recipients may not always
receive the DME that they medically need.'45 Additionally, the court
noted that the standard requires the Medicaid recipients to prove that
the state's DME coverage does not comply with federal law, t 46 and it is
appropriate to show the "reasonableness and adequacy" of the preap-
proved list to the Medicaid population of the state in terms of a per-
centage.' 47 The court, however, does not describe how large the
percentage has to be to gain coverage. The court also stated that a
cost-benefit analysis could be used to justify denial of coverage.148
The court, though did not explain how a cost-benefit analysis would
be used in conjunction with a percentage.
The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in Curtis v. Taylor'49
employed similar reasoning in upholding the Medicaid population as
a whole standard. In Curtis, Florida decreased the number of physi-
cian visits that it would cover to three visits and to emergencies. t 50
The plaintiffs argued that this decrease violated the federal Medicaid
Act,15 ' and that the services provided "must be determined with re-
gard to each individual who receives medical services."' 52 The statis-
tics submitted to the court illustrated, however, that "most Medicaid
recipients do not require more than three visits in any calendar
143. 139 F.3d 80 (2d. Cir. 1998).
144. Id. at 90-91.
145. See id. at 91-92. The court stressed that a state does not have to cover all medically
necessary services and even noted that they understood that this means that some DME
that are medically necessary to a "particular Medicaid recipient" will not be covered by
Medicaid. Id. at 91; see Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 784 (1977) (up-
holding a limit of 21 days for hospitalization for Medicaid recipients while realizing that
some Medicaid recipients may require longer than 21 days of hospitalization); see also Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (finding that the Medicaid Act does not require a state to
cover "every medical procedure falling within the delineated categories of medical care").
But see Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that a state must
provide all medically necessary services in order to meet the purpose of the Medicaid Act).
146. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 96.
147. Id. at 97 (citing Charleston Mem'l Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir.
1982); Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 653 (5th Cir. 1980)).
148. Id. at 98, 98 n.14.
149. 625 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1980).
150. Id, at 647.
151. Id. at 650.
152. Id. at 651.
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month."' 53 The court upheld the reduction in coverage because
other circuits have permitted it, and because this limitation is not
based "'solely' upon the 'diagnosis, type of illness, or condition' of the
recipient."' 54 The state regulation, however, may not explicitly base
the limit on the type of diagnosis or condition, but instead the limita-
tion is based implicitly on all those medical conditions that require
more than three physician visits per month. The court concluded by
stating that the coverage just needs to provide "adequate" services for
the "medical needs of most of the individuals eligible for Medicaid as-
sistance.' 55 It appears then that if more Medicaid recipients had re-
quired more than three visits per month, then the limitation would
not have been permitted.
The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate156 also supported the
Medicaid population as a whole test, albeit with different language. In
Alexander, the plaintiffs brought an action against the State of Tennes-
see for proposing to reduce the number of inpatient days Medicaid
would cover because it would violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and put the handicapped at a disadvantage. 5 7 The Court
held that the proposal would not violate the Act.'58 Statistical evi-
dence was introduced to show that "27.4% of all handicapped users of
hospital services who received Medicaid required more than 14 days
of care, while only 7.8% of nonhandicapped users required more than
14 days of inpatient care. " "' The Supreme Court noted these per-
centages, but stated that the Medicaid Act does not assure that each
153. Id. (emphasis added). The statistics showed that "[iln Florida, only 3.9% of the
second quarter 1977 Medicaid population required more than three physicians' visits in
any month of that quarter." Id. at 651 n.10. Additionally, only .5% needed more than
three visits in one month. See id. The plaintiffs, however, provided documentation that
they would need more than three visits per month. See id. at 651 n.ll. One of the plaintiffs
had cirrhosis of the liver, tuberculosis, and chronic anemia, and his physician stated that
he could not treat his patient properly with the limit of three visits per month. See id.
Additionally, physicians testified that some conditions such as asthma, urinary tract infec-
tions, pneumonia, and acute tonsillitis could not be treated with this restriction. See id.
154. Id. at 651-52 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 440.230).
155. Id. at 653 (emphasis added) (citing Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp.
781, 786 (E.D. Va. 1977)). In Virginia Hospital Ass'n, the court found that a reduction in
coverage to 21 days would meet the needs of 92% of the Medicaid population. Virginia
Hosp. Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. at 786; see also David M. Eddy, Rationing Resources While Improving
Quality: How to Get More for Less, 272 JAMA 817, 820 (1994) (advocating the identification
of "no-value or low-value practice[s]" and developing guidelines for discouraging their use
and understanding that this practice may deny coverage from those who may benefit from
"no-value or low-value practice[s]").
156. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
157. See id. at 289, 290. The state proposed a reduction from 20 to 14 days. See id.
158. Id. at 289.
159. Id. at 290.
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Medicaid recipient will receive "that level of health care precisely tai-
lored to his or her particular needs. Instead, the benefit provided
through Medicaid is a particular package of health care services
.... "160 Thus, the Court implied that not enough of the Medicaid
population is affected to warrant denying the proposal, and thus the
Medicaid Act does not mandate tailored care to individual recipients.
It appears that if the statistics had shown that a larger part of the
Medicaid population would have been affected or that the affected
handicapped individuals made up a large portion of the Medicaid
population as a whole, then the proposal would not have been
acceptable.161
B. Physician's Discretion Test
The physician's discretion test has been used primarily to deter-
mine medical necessity when a covered procedure or DME is denied
to a particular Medicaid beneficiary. This Comment argues that the
physician's discretion should be given more weight in determining
whether a state should cover certain DME and procedures and should
be used within certain limitations in place of the Medicaid population
as a whole test.
In its simplest terms, the physician's discretion test provides cov-
erage of services that physicians determine are medically necessary in
an individual case. 162 For example, the district court in DeSario v.
Thomas,t 63 advocated the reliance on physicians to determine what is
medically necessary and thus what Medicaid covers.' 64 The DeSario
160. Id. at 303. An earlier court of appeals case made a similar finding in a case where
the state plan was limiting the number of inpatient and outpatient hospital days covered by
Medicaid. Charleston Mem'l Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 329 (1982). Statistical evi-
dence presented demonstrated that the limit on inpatient days would fully meet the needs
of 88% of Medicaid recipients, and the limit on the outpatient days would fully meet the
needs of 99% of the Medicaid recipients. See id. at 330. Because of these percentages, the
court found that the state plan was sufficient because it would meet the needs of 'most'
Medicaid recipients. Id.; see supra note 144.
161. This.contention appears to be true also with the case of Charleston Memorial Hospital
because the Court was so concerned with percentages affected by the limitation. 469 U.S.
at 330; see supra note 156 (discussing Charleston Memorial Hospital v. Conrad).
162. See Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 230 ("Traditionally, insurers considered care and
services medically necessary whenever treating physicians said they were necessary."). As
health care costs rose, Medicare and Medicaid "began to review the medical necessity of
physicians' treatment recommendations as the basis for determining which procedures
and services would be covered." Id. (citing Bergthold LA. Medical necessity: do we need
it? Health Aff (Millwood) 1995; 14(4):180-90)).
163. 963 F. Supp. 120 (1998).
164. Id. at 133. The district court incorrectly put coverage and medical necessity to-
gether while the court of appeals properly distinguished the two concepts from each other.
See DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 92 (1998) (stating that "medical necessity and cover-
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district court also maintained that the state must examine the medical
necessity of an item before excluding it from coverage. 165 This pro-
cess would thus require determining the medical necessity of each
claim for each individual rather than basing coverage on the percent-
age of the Medicaid population that uses the item.
The DeSario court based this reasoning, in part, on Preterm, Inc. v.
Dukakis,16 6 a First Circuit Court of Appeals decision.16 7 Preterm in-
volved Medicaid coverage of abortions that had been limited by state
statute.' 68 The court found that there were two levels of judgment in
assessing medical necessity. 169 One is the "macro-decision," which the
legislature makes as to what the Medicaid plans cover, and the second
is the "micro-decision," which the physician makes as to whether his
patient requires a specific service "that [a] plan makes available."' 70
The court did not apply the micro-decision because the case con-
cerned a state's statute.' 7 ' The court in Preterm, unlike the DeSario dis-
trict court, recognized that a physician's discretion traditionally comes
into play when considering when a Medicaid recipient should receive
a covered service, not what services a state should cover. This case is
important, however, in making the distinction between coverage and
medical necessity and for recognizing the importance of a physician's
discretion.' 
7 2
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has been particularly friendly to
the physician's discretion test. For example, in Pinneke v. Preisser,173
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the state Medicaid
plan must cover "sex reassignment surgery," which was not covered at
all by the state's plan because it is the only procedure available for the
condition of transsexualism and was deemed medically necessary for
age are distinct concepts; a patient's medical necessity does not determine whether a par-
ticular item or service is covered"). In linking medical necessity and coverage, however,
the district court comes close to this Comment's proposition. See infta notes 240-248 and
accompanying text.
165. 963 F. Supp. at 134.
166. 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979).
167. See DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 133 (discussing Preterm, Inc.).
168. See Preterm, Inc., 591 F.2d at 122.
169. Id. at 125.
170. Id.
171. See id. ("Our task here is to test the judgment of the Massachusetts legislature as to
medical necessity. .. ").
172. See id. (recognizing the importance of a physician's opinion but realizing that a
state plan cannot cover all services deemed medically necessary by a physician because the
variations of medically necessary services would be "limited only by the diversity of
physicians").
173. 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
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the plaintiff by her physician. 74 The court noted that professional
medical judgement is extremely important in determining medical
necessity and coverage.'75 Additionally, the court stated that the legisla-
tive history supports the conclusion that a physician's judgement is
particularly important and shows that "Congress intended medical
judgments to play a primary role in the determination of medical ne-
cessity." ''  Therefore, the court held that "the decision of whether or
not certain treatment or a particular type of surgery is 'medically nec-
essary' rests with the individual recipient's physician and not with cler-
ical personnel or government officials" and thus the state must
provide coverage for the previously noncovered service.
177
C. Analysis
1. The Problems with the Medicaid Population as a Whole Test. -The
HCFA letter clearly states that the Medicaid population as a whole test
is no longer to be employed in determining coverage of DME.1 78 The
standard, however, may still be applied by states to Medicaid coverage
174. Id. at 548.
175. Id. at 549 (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 n.9 (1977)). But see DeSario, 139
F.3d at 97 (finding that a physician does not have to be included in determining what a
state Medicaid plan should cover as long as medical professionals such as a nurse and
physical therapist are included in the decision making process). The Pinneke court, like
the DeSario district court, meshed together the concepts of coverage and medical necessity
by applying the medical necessity to determine whether a noncovered procedure should
be covered by a state plan. In doing so, however, the court appears to be saying that it is
logical that to some extent medical necessity should be considered, not only when deter-
mining if a Medicaid recipient should receive a covered service, but also when a state de-
cides what services to cover.
176. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549-50 (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1943, 1986-89 (1965). This Senate
report states that:
3(a) Conditions and limitation on payment for services.
(1) Physicians' role
The committee's bill provides that the physician is to be the key figure in
determining utilization of health services and provides that it is a physician who is
to decide upon admission to a hospital, order tests, drugs and treatments, and
determine the length of stay. For this reason the bill would require that payment
could be made only if a physician certifies to the medical necessity of the services
furnished.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1943,
1986-89 (1965).
177. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 550; see also Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 199 (8th Cir.
1989) (using Pinneke to find that a state plan must provide the drug AZT to all Medicaid
recipients with the AIDS virus whose physicians have certified the treatment as medically
necessary because AZT is the only available treatment and denying coverage creates "an
irrebuttable presumption that AZT can never be medically necessary treatment for AIDS
patients").
178. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1.
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of other services or equipment. Additionally, HCFA did not provide
an alternative standard, so states may adopt similar standards that
have the same negative consequences as the Medicaid population as a
whole test. Therefore, it is important to note the shortcomings of us-
ing such a test in the future. The most glaring detriment of the stan-
dard is the burden it places on the Medicaid beneficiary to show,
through statistical evidence, that the DME provides a benefit to the
Medicaid population as a whole.179 Additionally, the standard, or a
version of it, results in the practice of bad medicine, violations of the
Medicaid Act, and the rationing of health care.
2. The Test's Detriments as Evidenced in Case Law.--The Medicaid
population as a whole test was used by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in denying coverage to Medicaid beneficiaries for DME not
included in a state's preapproved plan. 18 ° According to the Court of
Appeals, this test was the appropriate one under the Medicaid Act for
determining a state plan's coverage. 1 ' The district court, however,
was firmly opposed to the use of the Medicaid population as a whole
test.'82 The district court stated that in relation to the intervenor
Slekis it was "self-evident that the fee schedule does not provide a
meaningful medical benefit for the Medicaid population as a whole
'who is at risk of experiencing' skin breakdowns."'8 3 Additionally, the
district court noted that the test requires the Medicaid beneficiary to
support the showing that the DME benefits the Medicaid population
as a whole with statistical data that DSS does not even have. l8 4 Finally,
the district court concluded that placing such a harsh requirement on
a Medicaid recipient seeking coverage for DME, not on the fee sched-
179. Cf id. (stating that this burden "establishes a standard that virtually no individual
item of [D]ME can meet").
180. See DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 96-98 (2d Cir. 1998).
181. Id. at 96.
182. DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 142 (D. Conn. 1997) (Plaintiffs' Motion for
Clarification (Doc. 86)). The district court described the Medicaid population as a whole
test as placing the burden of proof on the Medicaid beneficiary to show that "the MEDS
fee schedule 'is inadequate to meet the medical equipment needs for the Medicaid popula-
tion as a whole, or alternatively.., that the medical equipment covered by the Department
[DSS] is inadequate to provide a meaningful medical benefit for the Medicaid population
as a whole who is experiencing, or at risk of experiencing skin breakdowns [like Slekis].'"
Id.
183. Id. The court also noted that part of the problem with the Medicaid population as
a whole test was wrapped up in the shortcomings of using a DME fee schedule or pre-
approved list without also considering medical necessity. Id.; see supra notes 64-78 and
accompanying text.
184. DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 142 (citing Testimony of Dr. Deutsch, Jan. 9, 1997, Trans. at
511-12).
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ule, "virtually . . . restore[s] the MEDS fee schedule as a dispositive
criterion in evaluating requests for prior authorization" which the dis-
trict court clearly prohibited in granting the preliminary
injunction. 18 5
Thus, the district court believed that such a burden would be al-
most impossible to meet and that DSS cannot request the Medicaid
recipient to provide information that it cannot provide itself. The
practical result of having a Medicaid population as a whole test is an
immutable preapproved list; the only entities capable of changing this
list and the most unlikely to do so are the DSS or Congress who can
change the Medicaid Act.186 Additionally, such an immutable preap-
proved list contradicts the objective of the Medicaid Act because it can
not be considered a reasonable standard for determining coverage.' 87
The preapproved list is not reasonable because it is a static standard
that does not allow for updating the list to accommodate positive
changes in the medical field, and it does not provide a method for
determining if a state has arbitrarily left a piece of DME off of the
list.' 88
3. The Test's Detriments as Evidenced by the Medical Profession. -The
use of the Medicaid population as a whole test can produce adverse
medical results and ultimately result in rationing. An article in The
185. Id. at 142-43. The court is referring to its finding that the exclusive list violates the
Medicaid Act because with the exclusive list there was no proper way of updating the list or
showing that an unlisted DME should be covered, and therefore DSS should add to the list
any DME which is shown to be medically necessary. Id. at 130 (Ruling on Plaintiffs' Mo-
tions for Preliminary Injunction (Docs. 3 & 68)); see supra notes 64-78 and accompanying
text (describing the court's reasoning in more detail). But see DeSario, 139 F.3d at 91 (stat-
ing that a state plan does not have to provide a method for reviewing new DME products
"or allow[ing] an individual applicant for prior authorization to make [the] showing" that
a noncovered DME meets the definition of DME and should be covered because a state has
discretion in determining coverage and does not have to provide all DME which are medi-
cally necessary).
186. See Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1 ("Requiring a beneficiary to
meet this test as a criterion for determining whether an item is covered, therefore, fails to
provide a meaningful opportunity for seeking modifications of or exceptions to a State's
pre-approved list.").
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (requiring reasonable standards for states in deter-
mining coverage); DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 131 (stating that the preapproved list violates
the Medicaid Act because it was an "unreasonable restriction on the amount, duration, and
scope of a provided service").
188. See Letter from Sally K Richardson, supra note 3, at 2 (maintaining that the states
in determining coverage should have reasonable criteria for determining coverage and for
judging coverage, and "these criteria must be sufficiently specific to permit a determina-
tion of whether an item of DME that does not appear on a State's preapproved list has
been arbitrarily excluded from coverage based solely on a diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition").
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New England Journal of Medicine argues against the use of generalized
evidence as required by the Medicaid population as a whole test, be-
cause such evidence opposes the practice of good medicine. 9 The
article contends that the predominant use of generalized evidence "is
at odds with good medical practice," it is practically impossible to de-
sign studies "that can answer all clinical questions," and "much of the
existing evidence that might be used to justify wholesale, nonreview-
able exclusions of coverage is of insufficient scientific quality to dis-
place clinical judgement. "190
The article continues by stating that the practice and ethics of
medicine require the physician to take into account the particular pa-
tient when deciding his treatment and not to apply "general rules ar-
bitrarily to all cases" because general rules do not always help the
individual patient.19' Thus, this "one size fits all" practice of medicine
does not actually fit all, and therefore, some patients do not receive
the services that they need.192 The Medicaid population as a whole
test used in conjunction with a preapproved list results in "one size fits
all" medicine, which is inadequate medicine because recipients who
do not fit into the generalizations do not receive proper care and have
no true method of appealing the denial of coverage. 193 These results
thus contradict the stated purpose of the Medicaid Act to provide ser-
vices "in the best interest of the recipient."'94
Furthermore, the Medicaid population as a whole test used in
conjunction with a predetermined list may eliminate physician discre-
189. Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 230. Generalized evidence refers to determining
medical coverage based on studies showing the benefit to the population. See id. (citing
Eddy, supra note 155). This article is about the shift away from insurance programs al-
lowing physicians to determine medical necessity and to the insurers determining it based
on generalized evidence to determine coverage and not permitting review of this coverage.
Id. at 229-30. The situation described in the article is analogous to the use of the Medicaid
population as a whole test in determining whether a Medicaid recipient should receive
coverage for a noncovered DME or medical service because both place the burden on the
recipient to provide statistical evidence that the service provides a medical benefit and
both result in a coverage policy that is virtually nonreviewable by the recipient. See id.
190. Id. at 230.
191. Id
192. Id. at 231; see id. at 230 (describing Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir.
1996), in which a child with cerebral palsy was denied physical therapy prescribed by her
physician because the insurer denied coverage based on an article in a medical journal).
193. But see DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the Medicaid
population as a whole test and the preapproved list consistent with the objectives of the
Medicaid Act even though it "means that an individual with a rare condition or unusual
needs, who must have a costly item of DME that... [the state] has not chosen to cover and
that is needed by a handful of the Medicaid population, will have to look for other sources
of assistance").
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19).
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tion entirely; the physician's "knowledge of the individual patient is
rendered irrelevant.11 9 5 Those with the most expertise are replaced
by statistics or by those in the medical field who have less knowledge
of the patient than his or her physician, such as nurses or physical
therapists.1 96 Even with HCFA eliminating the Medicaid population
as a whole test and mandating a method for appeal, physicians may be
kept out of the system. Because HCFA does not provide an alternative
standard nor define precisely how large the Medicaid population as a
whole is,197 states may decide to implement an appellate process and
put the burden of proof on the Medicaid recipient to show that at
least fifty percent of the Medicaid population require the DME or ser-
vice. This burden is still hard to meet, and the physician is still absent
from the process except for initially prescribing the service or DME to
the Medicaid patient. Leaving out the most important and most
knowledgeable person, the physician, to a Medicaid patient's health,
is not in the recipient's best interest and thus, again, violates the ob-
jective of the Medicaid Act.198
The Court of Appeals in DeSario noted that it is unrealistic and
difficult to continuously be required to update the preapproved DME
list because new DME are always coming onto the market with little
scientific study.1 9 9 Therefore, requiring a Medicaid recipient to show
that most of the Medicaid population would receive a benefit from
the DME is a method of avoiding updating the list and mistakenly
adding an item of DME that has had little scientific study and may
eventually be proven unbeneficial. The Court of Appeals, however,
did not consider that the evidence that the Medicaid recipient em-
ploys to demonstrate that the Medicaid population as a whole test
could be faulty and just as unreliable as scientific studies for new
equipment.20 Demanding the showing of such evidence also requires
195. Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 231.
196. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 97 (stating that a state's method of deciding what was to be
covered was sufficient without requiring the input of a physician because the committee
that determined coverage had a nurse and physical therapist).
197. See Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that the Medicaid
population as a whole test means showing that "most" of the Medicaid population would
benefit and not providing an alternative standard for the Medicaid population as a whole
standard).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (19) (requiring, among other things, that all "care [be
given] .. .in a manner consistent with .. .the best interests of the recipients").
199. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 97.
200. See Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 231 (questioning the reliability of most medical
studies because they are done in controlled situations or isolation and not in actual prac-
tice and the most effective studies, "randomized clinical trials," are too expensive to
conduct).
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a standard for the type of evidence provided to ensure quality, thus
making the Medicaid population as a whole standard even more diffi-
cult to satisfy. Therefore, a physician's opinion should be taken into
account when deciding coverage in addition to scientific studies par-
ticularly because "[m] uch of medical practice is the result of tradition
and collective experience" and not solely of scientific studies and
statistics.2 °1
4. Rationing Effects.-The Medicaid population as a whole test,
or a test with a similar burden, used in conjunction with a predeter-
mined list of covered services results in the rationing of health care.
The Court of Appeals in DeSario noted that the Medicaid Act does not
require the states to cover all medically necessary services and stated
that the result is that "an individual with a rare condition or unusual
needs, who must have a costly item of DME that... [the state] has not
chosen to cover and that is needed by a handful of the Medicaid pop-
ulation, will have to look for other sources of assistance. "022 It follows
that the Court of Appeals believed it was satisfactory for some of the
Medicaid population not to receive treatment while most of the popu-
lation did, which is rationing.
The rationing of health care is not entirely an abominable prac-
tice and "is inevitable in any responsible kind of financial protection
against unpredictable health care costs."2 °3 The Medicaid Act at-
tempts to avoid such unpredictable health concerns. Medicaid recipi-
ents who are denied coverage, however, often cannot afford to pay for
coverage elsewhere as the Court of Appeals implied a recipient should
when it stated that they could "look for other sources of assistance. "24
When a Medicaid recipient is forced to use the Medicaid population
as a whole test, or a version of it, he or she does not have the ability to
show that he or she medically needs the denied service or DME, or
that the DME or service is actually cost-effective compared to another
201. Id. But see Eddy, supra note 155, at 820 (stating that physicians are poor at prescrib-
ing services that provide a high value and often prescribe those that have a low value).
202. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 96.
203. Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract to Accept Health
Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1758 (1992).
204. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 97.
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covered service. 20 5 Therefore, the rationing becomes based on purely
economic, and not medical, grounds.2 °6
As has been demonstrated, it is well established that the Medicaid
Act does not require a state to provide all services and DME deter-
mined to be medically necessary. 9°7 The Medicaid population as a
whole test, however, goes a step further and eliminates the possibility
that those with unusual needs, such as Slekis, will ever be able to re-
ceive coverage. A right to health care has not been recognized by the
Supreme Court and thus "the legitimacy of restrictive rules cannot be
questioned; the public has a clear right to limit any entitlements it
democratically creates."20 8 A Medicaid recipient with the help of his
physician, however, should be given the opportunity not to show that
the Medicaid population as a whole will benefit but that the particular
Medicaid recipient has a strong medical need, such as Slekis and
DeSario, for a particular DME and service and that for him or for her
it is more cost-effective and beneficial than any other remedy.
D. The Benefits of the Physician's Discretion Test
Physicians work most closely with the Medicaid patient and know
the patient's health needs and how best to meet these needs. Accord-
ing to Rosenbaum, " [t] he practice of medicine has a core ethical di-
mension and requires that the physician use his or her knowledge of
the particular patient in deciding on the course of treatment along
with the patient."2 9 The Medicaid population as a whole test takes
this ability away from the physician. The physician's opinion should
be taken into account both when deciding whether a service or DME
that is not covered by a predetermined list should be covered for a
particular Medicaid patient, and when deciding what the fee schedule
will cover just as the physician's opinion is used in deciding the medi-
205. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text (describing the condition of Slekis).
Havighurst noted that most public-provided health care does have some form of utilization
management but states that "these cost-containment programs are tolerable because, os-
tensibly at least, they seek only to eliminate care that is inappropriate by medical standards
or to ensure that lower-cost methods are used when medically equivalent." Havighurst,
supra note 203, at 1761. With the Medicaid population as a whole test, however, someone
like Slekis who showed that the denied DME was more cost-effective than his current treat-
ment can still be denied coverage because he did not meet the burden of the test.
206. See Havighurst, supra note 203, at 1761 ("The controls on health care financing that
are most threatening to patients are those that threaten to deny payment for specific ser-
vices on economic rather than purely medical grounds.").
207. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
208. Havighurst, supra note 203, at 1762.
209. Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 230.
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cal necessity of a service or DME for a Medicaid recipient who has
been denied coverage of a covered service.2"'
For example, injeneski v. Myers,21 1 the California Court of Appeals
recognized the importance of a physician's expertise and found that
prior authorization procedures, mandatory by Medi-Cal and necessary
for obtaining certain drugs, were prohibited because a doctor of phar-
macy, rather than a physician, made the decision whether or not to
approve the prior authorization. 212 The court stated that it was illogi-
cal to believe that a doctor or pharmacy "is capable of making that
type of informed judgment which is necessary to ultimately review any
request for prior approval for a drug which the requesting physician
in his experience has found to be medically necessary and indicated
for a patient with whom he is intimately familiar. '213 Additionally, the
court asserted that coverage and prior approval decisions should re-
flect "the practical experience only possessed by one who is skilled in
the medical field and perhaps even in certain specialties. 214
This decision recognizes the importance of a physician's medical
judgment and that by making certain drugs totally unavailable, the
state fails to recognize "the necessity that some patients have for drugs
that might be merely palliative for others" and that these decisions
need to be made on a "patient-by-patient basis.12 1'  The Medicaid pop-
ulation as a whole test essentially assures that DME not on the list are
totally unavailable and takes the physician out of the decision. The
physician is an essential part of the system due to his experience and
expertise and thus should be taken into account when a state decides
what to cover and when deciding whether to cover, for a particular
Medicaid recipient, a service or DME that is not a covered item.
210. See DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F.,Supp. 120, 132 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that "cate-
gorical exclusion of certain pieces of DME without considering medical necessity violates
federal Medicaid law"). But see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) ("Medicaid
programs do not guarantee that each recipient will receive that level of health care pre-
cisely tailored to his or her particular needs.").
211. 163 Cal. App. 3d 18 (1984).
212. Id. at 31-32. The California regulation removed antihistamines, topical dermato-
logical preparations, cough and cold preparations, and other prescription drugs from a list
of covered drugs. Id. at 24. Some physicians revolted against this new regulation by mak-
ing such comments as the system is a "mockery of any attempt to impart any rational health
care to the needy" and is "a clear class system of medical treatment." Id.
213. Id. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dodson v. Parham, 427 F.
Supp. 97, 108 (N.D. Ga. 1977)).
214. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dodson, 427 F. Supp. at 108).
215. Id. at 33. As an example, the court noted that the elderly and infants may suffer
from conditions that are considered minor by other parts of the population. Id.
[VOL. 59:669
DuRABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
E. Medicare Coverage of Medical Equipment
In determining the coverage standards of DME for Medicaid, it
may be useful to look at how DME is covered under Medicare. The
Medicare program appears to give significant weight to the physician's
determination of medical necessity or to a physician's expertise in all
aspects of deciding coverage and does not require a showing that the
DME will benefit the Medicare population as a whole." 6 It is neces-
sary, however, to note that the differences between the two systems'
type of coverage may be because Medicare covers the elderly217 while
Medicaid covers the poor, and Medicare is run solely by the federal
government while Medicaid is run by both state and federal
governments.
DME is covered by Medicare Part B and is defined as "equipment
which can withstand use; is primarily and customarily used to serve a
medical purpose; is generally not useful to a person in the absence of
an illness or injury; and is appropriate for use in the home." '218 Addi-
tionally, the Medicare statute provides a list of items that the term
durable medical equipment includes such as "iron lungs, oxygen
tents, hospital beds, and wheelchairs."2 1 9 In essence, the statute pro-
vides a predetermined list of what will be covered. The list, however,
is not exhaustive but merely provides examples of covered items, un-
like the predetermined list in DeSario that was meant to be exhaustive
and makes it very difficult for a Medicaid beneficiary to receive cover-
age for an item of DME not on the list.220
Some have argued that the use of the term "durable medical
equipment" in the Medicare Act is outdated and therefore results in
the denial of coverage of new DME because the DME industry uses
the term "'home medical equipment' . . . [which] reflect[s] the fact
216. See Kinney, supra note 225, at 892 (noting that "[a]lthough HHS has assumed a
more aggressive role in formulating coverage policy in recent years, the agency still relies
heavily on insurance companies to make most coverage decisions and coverage policy, and
on physicians for their expertise in formulating specific coverage policies" (citation
omitted)).
217. See Miller v. Heckler, 601 F. Supp. 1471, 1472 (E.D. Tex. 1985) ("The Medicare
program was enacted in 1965 to furnish federal health insurance to the elderly and
disabled.").
218. 42 C.F.R. § 405.524(b) (1991); see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (noting
the Medicare definition of DME and that Medicaid does not have a definition). Medicare
Part A provides insurance for the cost of hospital and related post-hospital services. 42
U.S.C. § 1395c. Medicare Part B is a voluntary program of supplemental medical insur-
ance which covers expenses not covered by Part A such as durable medical equipment. 42
U.S.C. § 1395j.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(n).
220. See supra notes 64-117 and accompanying text.
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that significant technological advances have occurred since the days of
the iron lung." '' Weitzman, in Legal and Policy Aspects of Home Care
Coverage, contended that these examples of DME appear "restrictive
and similarly outmoded," and therefore, the statute should not have
specific examples but should "provide for any 'certifiably effective'
home medical equipment currently available or developed in the fu-
ture."222 This proposition is beyond the scope of this Comment,
which does not argue that predetermined lists should be prohibited.
Rather, this Comment finds the lists administratively efficient as
HCFA points out,2 2 and merely calls for consideration of the physi-
cian's determinations in deciding coverage and in appeals for denied
coverage of items not covered by preapproved lists.
Coverage determinations under the Medicare Act are compli-
cated. 224 They are made at two levels. The first level of determination
is whether a technology, procedure, or service "should be covered as a
matter of general policy. '225 This situation occurs when coverage
questions arise from carriers or from HCFA, and HCFA decides to
expand Medicare coverage.226 Often, physicians will be consulted at
this stage. 227 The second level of coverage determinations is the "indi-
vidual beneficiary level. '228 The coverage determinations, in individ-
ual cases, require a decision based on medical criteria that establishes
whether the benefit was either necessary and reasonable in a specific
instance or provided in an appropriate setting.229 Because DME fall
under Part B, carriers make this second level coverage determina-
221. S. Mitchell Weitzman, Legal and Policy Aspects of Home Care Coverage, 1 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 1, 10 (1992).
222. Id.
223. See Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 3, at 1 ("A State may develop a list of
pre-approved items of [D]ME as an administrative convenience because such a list elimi-
nates the need to administer an extensive application process for each [D]ME request
submitted.").
224. See, e.g., Laura Callahan, Medicare Coverage Policy (Fall 1998) (on file with author)
(describing Medicare's coverage policy); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for
Coverage and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 14-
15 (1987) (noting that "[d]ue to the inherent uncertainty in these types of coverage deci-
sions, Congress authorized the Secretary of HHS to waive a beneficiary's or provider's lia-
bility for services not covered on the basis of medical criteria if the beneficiary or provider
did not know or have reason to know that such services were not covered" (footnote
omitted)).
225. Kinney, supra note 224, at 13.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 13-14.
228. Id. at 14.
229. See id.
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tion.2 3 ° It is questionable as to how much input physicians have at the
individual level because physicians have expressed concern that at the
individual beneficiary level carriers do not take into account the "spe-
cific circumstances of the individual patients involved. '23 1 At the na-
tional level, however, physicians are quite satisfied with how HCFA
makes coverage determinations, particularly because of the influence
that physicians have over the decisions. 232 It appears that the Medi-
care coverage decisions at the individual beneficiary levels have the
same problem of lack of physician involvement as Medicaid does at
deciding whether to cover a noncovered DME for a single beneficiary.
Congress and States, however, should follow how the Medicare system
operates at the national level and mandate that states participating in
Medicaid must take into consideration a physician's opinion in deter-
mining coverage at all times.23 3
The standard for determining coverage at both levels is whether
the item of DME is "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a mal-
formed body member."234 This standard, however, is not necessarily
any clearer then that of the Medicaid standard, or lack thereof, for the
Medicaid and the Medicare standard result in different decisions re-
garding the same questions of coverage. For example, because DME
is covered under Part B of the Medicare Act, coverage decisions are
made on a case-by-case basis by individual HCFA carriers and not on a
national level, and therefore discrepancies will exist between different
carries.23 5 Because Medicaid is a state and federal program, dispari-
230. See id.; 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1809, 405.1835, 405.815. Part B benefits are paid through
private insurance carriers under contract with the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u.
231. Eleanor D. Kinney, National Coverage Policy Under the Medicaid Program: Problems and
Proposals for Change, 32 ST. Louis U. LJ. 869, 908 (1988). Physicians also object to the fact
that they do not know how the carriers reach their conclusions. See id.
232. See id.
233. Note that Medicare has a Practicing Physicians Advisory Council that is to "meet
once during each calendar quarter to discuss certain proposed changes in regulation and
carrier manual instructions related to physician services identified by the Secretary." 42
U.S.C. § 1395ee.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1) (A); see also Quality of Care Information, Medicare Cover-
age Process, Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee (MCAC) (visited Apr. 24, 1999)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/quality/8bl-a.htm> (stating that "[t]he Secretary, and by delega-
tion, the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and the
Director of the Office of Clinical Standards and Quality, (OCSQ) HCFA are charged with
deciding which medical services and items are reasonable and necessary for Medicare ben-
eficiaries under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act").
235. See Kinney, supra note 231, at 906 ("Beneficiaries .. .question the current decen-
tralized policymaking process that results in beneficiaries in different parts of the country
getting different benefits.")
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ties are going to exist among the states because they have wide discre-
tion in coverage policy and implement their programs differently.
Therefore, the system should at least provide a fair method for cover-
age appeals for those items that are not covered by preapproved lists.
A fair system for coverage appeals includes placing the burden of
proof on the state and including physicians' expert opinions in the
decision.
Additionally, states should consider implementing the same sys-
tem for considering coverage of Medicaid services as Medicare has
implemented for its coverage at the national level. HCFA has issued
"a general guidance document describing in detail the rules and crite-
ria HCFA uses in its coverage reviews." '236 First, HCFA "weighs the
medical and scientific evidence in accordance with a fairly standard-
ized hierarchy that ranks the relative authority given to various types
of studies."237 Therefore, controlled clinical trials that are published
in peer-reviewed medical and scientific journals will carry more weight
than assessments issued by HCFA.23" Having a hierarchy of evidence
will eliminate some of the problems with having general evidence
tests23 9 because it assures that decisions will not rely solely on weak or
unsupportable evidence.
Furthermore, HCFA has established an Advisory Committee that
"will have open meetings and will discuss technical issues of major im-
portance or controversy relating to issues subject to the coverage re-
view process. "240 The Committee is to have a large contingency
"representing a broad range of disciplines, including industry and
consumers" and may include experts in the medical and scientific
fields, beneficiary and consumer experts, medical ethics experts, epi-
demiologists, and experts in health policy and law, among others.2 41
Even though the Committee is only advisory to HCFA,242 it appears
236. Quality of Care Information, How Coverage is Conducted, White Paper for Town
Hall Meeting Held on September 25, 1998 [hereinafter White Paper] (visited Apr. 24,
1999) <http://www.hcfa.gov/quality/8b2-c.htm>; see also Medicare Program; Procedures
for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22619, 22621-22 (1999) (stating that
determinations of national coverage will take into account such things as available medical
and scientific information and current clinical trials or studies).
237. White Paper, supra note 236.
238. See id.
239. See supra notes 185-192 and accompanying text (describing the problems of using
generalized evidence).
240. White Paper, supra note 236; see also Medicare Program; Procedures for Making
National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22619, 22623 (1999) (discussing how the advi-
sory committee functions).
241. White Paper, supra note 236.
242. See id.
[VOL. 59:669
DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
that the Committee has the ability to represent the views of those who
are affected by Medicare coverage and to have a positive influence on
HCFA's coverage decisions. State Medicaid plans should be required
to have a Committee with such high credentials and not be able to get
away with having only a nurse and a physical therapist and no physi-
cian aid in the coverage decisions.243
F. The Proposed Solution: A Flexible Standard
HCFA did not provide a standard to be used in place of the Medi-
caid population as a whole test. Therefore, states may attempt to use a
similar standard because it is most beneficial to them.2 44 However,
the test used for determining if a noncovered service or DME should
be covered for an individual Medicaid recipient should be based on a
number of factors, including benefit to the beneficiary and cost to the
state. The test should also be conducted on a case-by-case basis be-
cause these claims often involve a person's health and possibly his or
her life. 245 Neither the state nor the physician should be the sole
decision-maker as to what should be covered. Rather, the two parties
should collaborate while taking into consideration the best interests of
the Medicaid recipient. 246
If the physician is the sole decision-maker, then anything and eve-
rything could be covered by Medicaid including houses and swim-
ming pools. 24 7 Coverage would become "unlimited and budgeting
would be by blank check."248 Endless coverage would be catastrophic
to the Medicaid system because states do not have the funds to cover
all of these services, and "the only cost control measure available to a
state would be to avoid adopting new optional services under its Medi-
caid program, and to end some of the optional services that it already
243. See supra notes 79-117 and accompanying text (describing how Connecticut had a
nurse and physical therapist on their coverage committee).
244. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 123 (stating that an item of DME can be "potentially life-
saving").
246. See generally Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 229 (stating that coverage criteria should
include professional standards of clinical practice, but the treating physician should not
have total autonomy in making coverage decisions and that "[t]his middle position re-
quires insurers to act reasonably and weighs the reasonableness of their conduct against
professional standards of practice as reflected by valid reliable evidence").
247. See DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that permitting
physicians solely to decide coverage results in a "Medicaid recipient's physician ... be[ing]
able to create coverage by prescribing a particular procedure or item of equipment").
248. Id. at 96.
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provides." '249 Therefore, the physician's opinion should be a signifi-
cant factor in establishing coverage, but it must also be balanced
against the funding needs of the Medicaid program. Furthermore,
the coverage decision should consider how medically necessary2 50 the
service or DME is to the Medicaid recipient. For example, whether
the physician believes that the DME or service greatly increases the
patient's health, well-being, or quality of life, or has the potential to
save the patient's life should be considered.
The state or DSS also should not be the sole decision-maker be-
cause they simply do not have the medical expertise, without the help
of a panel of experts, to make the proper decision or to understand
correctly any medical evidence that they use to make determinations.
Additionally, in individual coverage decisions, the state or DSS has no
first-hand understanding of the individual patient's health needs or
circumstances. It appears that their main source of information re-
garding a DME or a service is generalized evidence that can often be
unreliable. 251 Therefore, standards need to be set as to which types of
evidence are more reliable and deserve more weight. 252 It has been
argued that all Medicaid recipients need is the ability to appeal cover-
age decisions.253 Procedural reform alone, however, cannot aid Medi-
caid beneficiaries if states and DSS are given broad discretion to
determine what standards will be employed in coverage decisions be-
cause "such protection would be an instance of winning a battle but
losing a war."254 In other words, an individual may be able to gain
coverage through procedural reform alone, but ultimately, there
needs to be a system where the standard is set and physicians' exper-
tise are taken into account so all recipients have the ability to win.
Therefore, this Comment advocates the adoption of a flexible
standard that balances various factors as a mechanism for determining
coverage of DME. First, the burden of proof should lie with the state
to show why it should not cover the DME or service in question and
249. Id.; see also Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that a
state plan cannot cover all medically necessary services because variations of medically nec-
essary services would be "limited only by the diversity of the physicians").
250. See supra note 2.
251. See supra notes 185-197 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of gen-
eralized evidence).
252. See supra notes 224-231 and accompanying text (discussing the Medicare coverage
systems and its hierarchy of evidence).
253. See Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 229 ("Groups such as the Advisory Commission
on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry have recommended only
procedural protection for patients, such as the right to a timely review of an adverse deci-
sion about coverage.").
254. Id.
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not on the Medicaid recipient to show that the DME or service bene-
fits some portion of the Medicaid population of the state. The state
would have to demonstrate that the physician's decision to prescribe
the DME or service goes against "clinically accepted standards of med-
ical practice" and is not in the best interest of the recipient. Addition-
ally, the cost of the item and whether a more useful or 'just as good"
DME or service exists should be considered but are less of an impor-
tant consideration than the physician's opinion that the recipient
needs the DME or service. Furthermore, the benefit of the DME or
service should be considered in the context that it may cost less in the
long run than alternative services or DME that are covered.2 5 5 There-
fore, cost consequences would have to greatly outweigh the patient's
needs for coverage to be denied when the physician has prescribed it,
and it meets clinically accepted standards of medical practice. It fol-
lows that these considerations would only have to slightly outweigh
cost considerations for coverage to be permitted.
CONCLUSION
Physician's expertise and clinical practices have long been used as
benchmarks for what good medical care is.256 "[F] or more than 200
years, the courts in malpractice cases have turned to clinical practices
for evidence of when and under what circumstances medical care
should be considered medically necessary .... ",25' As health care
costs have risen, however, states have become blinded by financial
concerns and have thus found it more useful to base decisions on fis-
cal policy rather than on a physician's standard of what is beneficial
for the patient. These concerns are real and need to be addressed,
but more important is the health of individual Medicaid recipients.
Our country may not have a constitutionally recognized right to
health care, but it does have an understanding of human dignity and
basic human rights. From these beliefs stems the need to at least en-
sure that poor disabled persons such as Slekis and DeSario have the
means of showing why they need to have certain DME or services cov-
ered by Medicaid and this includes employing their physicians' medi-
cal expertise in coverage decisions.
255. See, e.g., DeSario, 963 F. Supp. at 129 (stating that the environmental control unit
that plaintiff DeSario wanted would allow her to stay in her home rather than having to go
to a long-term care facility).
256. See Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (King's Bench 1767) (stat-
ing that "the usage and the law of surgeons ... [and] the rule of the profession" is the
correct standard of review for determining liability of a surgeon in malpractice suits).
257. Rosenbaum, supra note 11, at 230 (citing Slater, 95 Eng. Rep. at 862).
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